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Abstract:  As governments lack the rationality-promoting selective pressures of market 
competition, the standard (unbounded) rationality assumption is less legitimate in Public 
Choice than in analysis of markets.  This paper argues that many Public Choice problems 
require recognizing that human rationality has bounds, that these differ across individuals, and 
that rationality must therefore be treated as a special scarce resource, tied to individuals and 
used for deciding on its own uses.  This complicates resource-allocation in society, which has 
to rely on institutionally shaped selection processes.  But this also appears to be the only way 
to produce the long-missing analytical support to the first head of J.S. Mill’s criticism of 
government, of which Public Choice has so far supported only the second. 
 
Acknowledgements:  My inquiry into problems of unequally bounded rationality, on which 
this paper is based, lasted several years, which makes it impossible to thank all the colleagues 
and students by whom it has been helped.  I now thank Niclas Berggren, Edward Glaeser, 
Dennis Mueller and Viktor Vanberg for thoughtful comments that helped me with the present 
Public Choice application of its results, and the Ratio Institute for IT-assistance during my 
work on it in Sweden.  The usual caveat applies with emphasis. 
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"The positive evils and dangers of the representative, as of 
every other form of government, may be reduced to two 
heads: first, general ignorance and incapacity, or, to speak 
more moderately, insufficient mental qualifications, in the 
controlling body; secondly, the danger of its being under 
the influence of interests not identical with the general 
welfare of the community." (J. S. Mill, 1861/1972)1 
 
 
1  Modifying the Hard Core of Public Choice Analysis: How and Why 
 
In his account of the origins and development of the Public Choice research program, 
Professor Buchanan summarizes its hard core in three presuppositions: (1) methodological 
individualism, (2) rational choice, and (3) politics-as-exchange (Buchanan, 2003).  This paper 
argues that for many Public Choice problems it is necessary to modify two of them: to replace 
(2) by recognizing that human rationality is bounded in individually unequal ways, and to 
enlarge (3) by including politics-as-selection. 
 This argument builds on my more general inquiry into economic problems of 
unequally bounded rationality (Pelikan, 2006), which can be seen to depart from the standard 
rational choice assumption in three decreasingly usual steps.  First, as is now quite usual, 
human rationality is recognized to have bounds, but without considering their individual 
differences.  Second, as is less usual but no longer very novel, the rationality of some 
individuals is recognized to be bounded more, or differently, than the rationality of others.  
Most novel appears to be the third step, which shows that such unequally bounded rationality 
must be treated as a scarce resource, but of a highly special kind: much like human capital, it 
is tied to individuals, but unlike any other scarce resource, it must be used for deciding on its 
own uses.  This complicates the logical structure of the resource-allocation problem by a 
"tangled hierarchy" (Hofstadter, 1979), which excludes straightforward optimization, but 
requires, for its solution, institutionally shaped selection (evolutionary) process
 There appear to be three good reasons why all these steps should also be taken in 
Public Choice analysis, at least for those problems whose solutions may significantly depend 
on the rationality bounds of the individuals involved.  One concerns the legitimacy of the 
                                                 
1 I thank for this reference to Niclas Berggren. 
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assumptions on which theories are built.  While the perfect (unbounded) rationality 
assumption is now abandoned in an increasing number of economic theories, many other 
theories can still defend it as a reasonable working hypothesis by referring to the selective 
pressures of market competition.  As this can be shown to have rationality-promoting 
evolutionary effects, it is possible to argue that in the long run, the rationality of all the still 
present participants of a well-developed and reasonably competitive market may indeed be 
expected reasonably close to the assumed perfection.2 
 As the emphasized words imply, however, the validity of this defense is severely 
limited.  Namely, it is not valid for emerging markets, whose selective pressures have not yet 
had enough time to demote all the little rational entrepreneurs who are typically also trying 
there their chance, nor for the government sector, where market competition is entirely absent, 
replaced by voting, political selection, and administrative decisions.  It is the second 
limitation that prevents Public Choice analysis from using this defense.  Thus, to be 
reasonable, this analysis cannot but admit that far from perfectly rational, political agents may 
suffer from a broad variety of rationality bounds, and then add to its tasks the study of 
politics-as-selection, to see what these bounds will likely be. 
 The second reason concerns possible explanations of observed outcomes. Namely, far 
from all the social losses caused by inefficient government policies appear possible to explain 
by the rent-seeking of perfectly rational, but selfishly motivated policy-makers.  In many 
cases, it is clearly in their most selfish interest to make their policies succeed.  Then, if even 
such policies fail, there is hardly anything else to blame than the rationality bounds of their 
makers.  In folk wisdom, harm can be caused not only by bad intentions, but also by 
incompetence – which a suitable definition of "rationality" (see below) makes possible to 
express in terms of rationality bounds. 
 A nice illustration is the above-quoted criticism of government by J.S. Mill.  Existing 
Public Choice analysis provides a solid support for the second head, but, as long as it assumes 
that all individuals are perfectly rational, it cannot do the same for the first.  This assumption 
makes it indeed hard for any analysis to explain why government should have lower "mental 
qualifications" for economic decision-making than market participants – although 
corroborating empirical evidence appears far from missing. 
 The third reason is diplomatic, concerning the ways in which theorists can 
communicate with policy-makers and thus influence actual policies.  That such 
                                                 
2  The best known formulations of this argument are due to Alchian (1950), Friedman (1953) and  Winter (1971). 
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communication is essential for any practical application of theoretical results – even if they 
recommend limitations of government policies – may be useful to emphasize: to limit policies 
also requires policies, and such policy-limiting policies require that some policy-makers be 
persuaded to conduct them.  Starting with problems of relevant rationality, rather than 
incentives, makes it possible initially to accord the policy-makers the benefit of the doubt that 
they do have the best intentions to serve common good.  The communication can then be more 
friendly, and therefore also more effective, than if the theorists immediately assume them to be 
just selfish rent-seekers.  They can be friendly warned that even with the best intentions, they 
are still likely to cause important social losses, if they try to do things for which they are 
unlikely to be sufficiently qualified.  The litmus test of their intentions then is, whether or not 
they voluntarily abstain from doing such things. 
 Note that all these modifications of Public Choice analysis are less radical than they 
may seem to be.  They do not diminish the importance of incentives and rent-seeking, only 
add that unequally bounded rationality may also matter.  They do not even imply that it 
always does: for sufficiently simple policy issues, where all the policy alternatives with all the 
relevant consequences are easy to see, the perfect rationality assumption still can, and indeed 
should, be used.  It is only for more difficult policy issues – but which appear to be far more 
frequent in the real-world – that the rationality bounds of the individuals involved, including 
the policy-makers, the market participants, and the citizenry at large, are necessary to 
consider.  Moreover, the results of the modified analysis do not radically depart from the 
existing ones: as will become clear, the two will mostly complement, and only in some cases 
qualify, each other. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 defines the present meaning of 
"rationality," assumes (recognizes) its individually unequal bounds, and explains its role as a 
special scarce resource.  To provide a useful point of reference, Section 3 summarizes how, 
and with what expected results, rationality is allocated by competitive markets.  Section 4 
enters the area of Public Choice by examining how, and with what expected results, 
rationality can be allocated by politics-as-selection.  Section 5 concludes with a few policy 
implications. 
  
2  Unequally bounded rationality as a scarce resource 
 
The ways in which economists define rationality fall into two classes: the purely formal, or 
tautological ones, and the empirically meaningful ones, which link rationality to actual 
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cognitive abilities (competencies, “intelligence”) of human brains  As only the latter allow 
rationality bounds to be brought to light, the present definition must be of this class.3 
 
 DEFINITION 1.  “Rationality” means the cognitive abilities of human brains for 
solving economic problems – that is, problems of how best to use given resources under given 
constraints for the pursuit of given objectives (preferences, objective function).  It can exist in 
different varieties, relevant to different types of economic problems – e.g., involving different 
types of resources, different time horizons, or different degrees of risk or uncertainty.  An 
individual’s rationality is bounded if there are economic problems for which he or she is 
unable to find an optimal solution.4  For the sake of brevity, an individual whose rationality 
relevant to a certain type of economic problems is less bounded than the relevant rationality of 
another individual will be said to be, for these problems, “more rational,” and his rationality 
to be “higher.” 
 
 Why the purely formal definitions of rationality are unsuitable for Public Choice 
analysis, and indeed for all economic problems involving more than one person, should be 
realized.  As their aim is to defend the perfect rationality assumption even for an individual 
blatantly unable to find the right solutions to his economic problems, they include among the 
constraints of these problems also those on his or her problem-solving abilities (see, e.g., 
Boland, 1981).  Everyone can then indeed be said to be “perfectly rational” in the tautological 
sense of doing his or her best, however severe those constraints might be.  But to say so may 
be harmless only for one-person problems.  When several individuals are involved – as 
always in Public Choice – everyone can of course still be said to do his or her best, but this 
obscures the crucial fact that for the same objective function, the “best” of some individuals 
may be much better, or much worse, than the “best” of others.5 
 The present definition of rationality includes only a subset of all the human cognitive 
                                                 
 
3  The two classes correspond to the distinction between the non-refutable rationality principle and refutable 
rationality hypotheses used by Vanberg (2004). 
 
4  As bounded rationality is sometimes confused with imperfect information about the state of the world, note 
that the two are here sharply distinguished: rationality only means the personal cognitive abilities to find, 
understand and use such information, but not the information itself.  It is in how astutely the same imperfect 
information is exploited that some of the most important rationality differences come to light. 
  
5 A recent variant of this defense is in Eggertsson (2005), who makes it possible to say that all individuals are 
perfectly rational by admitting imperfections in their mental models.  Whether or not an individual with grossly 
mistaken ideas about the consequences of his actions can be declared perfectly rational may perhaps be a matter 
of taste, but doing so makes the notion of rationality completely meaningless. 
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abilities that may be considered part of human rationality in a more general sense.  To 
economists, however, it is this subset that matters most.  It has been in the center of their 
rationality debate, and it also plays a very special role in their theories.  Most of their theories 
need to assume that at least some of these abilities are perfect (unbounded) – including the 
theories of procedural rationality and rational irrationality.  While these theories admit 
bounded rationality for certain low-level economic problems, they assume perfect rationality 
for the higher-level economic problem of how best to use the bounded rationality for these 
lower-level problems.  In contrast, no such perfection is assumed here. 
 
 ASSUMPTION 1.  Rationality of all varieties and all levels is both bounded and 
individually unequal. 
 
 Unequally bounded rationality raises the problem of its measuring.  In principle, it 
could be measured by marking, in the entire set of the differently difficult problems that the 
agents of an economy might encounter, the subset of the sufficiently easy ones for which a 
given individual is able to find an optimal solution; or by estimating, for different problems of 
the entire set, the relative losses caused by the errors that the individual would likely commit 
if assigned to the task of solving them. 
 In practice, however, its measuring is limited to artificial experiments, intelligence 
tests, and problems in economic textbooks, which cannot yield more that rough and often 
insufficient indications.  For many real-world economic problems, especially the most 
complex ones, the relevant rationality cannot be objectively measured at all.  It can only be 
subjectively estimated, with the risk of committing more or less large errors, on which, in a 
first approximation, it is reasonable to assume the following. 
 
 ASSUMPTION 2:  The errors with which an individual's rationality is estimated 
depend on the rationality of the estimating individual: the more bounded this rationality, the 
larger the errors will likely be. 
 
 Importantly, this also includes the cases when individuals estimate their own 
rationality: those suffering from severe rationality bounds are likely to commit large errors 
also in such estimations, as they are typically unaware of how severe these bounds really are.6 
                                                 
6  In addition to casual observations of (and frequent irritation with) such individuals during personal encounters, 
their existence is now solidly documented in experimental psychology by Kruger and Dunning (1999), in their 
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 What complicates the issue, and may seem to weaken the two assumptions, is that an 
individual's rationality also depends on learning from education and experience, and may 
therefore vary, and hopefully improve, over time.  Let me therefore make it clear that no such 
weakening takes place.  As explained in more detail in Pelikan (2006), Assumption 1 remains 
in full force simply because all learning is conditioned and constrained by pre-existing 
learning abilities (talents), which also differ across individuals.  An interesting  implication is 
that in equally rich learning environments, rationality inequalities are likely to grow, rather 
than shrink.  Assumption 2 is clearly strengthened: talents often matter more, but are also 
more difficult to estimate, than actual rationality: recognizing talents requires indeed talents. 
 Recognizing that rationality has individually unequal bounds implies including it 
among scarce resources: individuals possess it in different quantities and qualities, and both 
their personal achievements and the performance of the entire economy depend on its uses.  
But being both a scarce resource and the abilities needed for deciding on the uses of scarce 
resources implies that it is needed for deciding on its own uses.  This causes a logical knot – 
in Hofstadter's (1979) terms, "tangled hierarchy" – with disturbing effects on several 
economic theories.7 
 For present purposes, the most important are the effects on standard resource-
allocation theory.  In addition to conflicting with its perfect rationality assumption, admitting 
unequally bounded rationality destroys the conceptual barrier between the sphere of agents 
and the sphere of resources, which the theory needs to separate rationality from scarcity.  It 
needs the agents to keep their initially given positions, where they use their assumedly 
abundant rationality for conducting economic calculus and deciding on the allocation of the 
scarce resources, while the resources move around and are allocated to different uses as a 
result of the agents’ decisions.  Intuitively, one may think of the difference between the 
players of a game of cards and the cards.  The theory needs this barrier to proceed in an 
orderly fashion from the decisions of agents to the allocation of resources. 
 But now, rationality spreads into the sphere of scarce resources, where its differently 
bounded individual endowments pose the problem of their allocation to efficient uses, while 
scarcity spreads into the sphere of agents, as agents endowed with differently bounded 
rationality are differently scarce, and may not therefore be able to keep their positions.  
                                                                                                                                                        
wittily titled article "Unskilled and unaware of it: how difficulties in recognizing one's own incompetence lead to 
inflated self-assessment.”  This evidence devalues all the standard models of allocation of abilities, including 
talents, that stand and fall with the assumption that all agents perfectly know the abilities of themselves. 
 
7  The problem with this tangled hierarchy appears to be a kin of the Russel Paradox and the Gödel Theorem, but 
clarifying this kinship is not easy and cannot be attempted here. 
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Rationality allocation may have to move them to different uses, much like any other scarce 
resource.  In the intuitive comparison with a game of cards, this is as if the players became 
themselves cards of different values and were included among the cards with which they play. 
 The problem of resource-allocation must therefore be enlarged by the one of 
rationality-allocation, and the traditional allocation processes by evolutionary selection 
processes, during which differently rational agents are promoted to, or demoted from, 
differently important and differently difficult positions (jobs, decision tasks).  The main 
questions then are:  How do such processes unfold?  To what outcomes they tend to arrive?  
On what factors do their unfolding and outcomes depend? 
 As shown in Pelikan (2006), the main factors are the prevailing institutions in the 
modern sense of rules of the game (North, 1990).  This ranges rationality-allocation among 
the problems of new institutional economics, but with questions that this economics has not 
yet properly addressed.  While NIE has mainly been concerned with the static effects of 
institutions on incentives, and in particular transaction costs, it is now demanded to clarify 
their evolutionary effects on the selection processes of rationality-allocation. 
 
3  Rationality-allocation by competitive markets: a summary 
 
The first steps to understanding how rationality is allocated by competitive markets can be 
seen in the above-mentioned references to Alchian (1950), Friedman (1953), and Winter 
(1971).  What these works have found is, in essence, that market competition has rationality-
promoting selection effects, which in the long run will make the behavior of the still 
successful ("surviving") competitors on a product market to converge to the highest 
rationality available.  But these findings are limited in two ways: they only concern a long-run 
evolutionary equilibrium, and only on product markets. 
 My attempts to overcome these limitations are in Pelikan (2006).  The rationality-
allocation by competitive markets is there examined for its evolution over time, starting from 
an inefficient initial state; and attention is extended to financial markets, considered to select 
investors according to how successful they are in selecting future successful producers. 
 My main findings can be summarized as follows.  Concerning time, the evolution is 
found to be possibly very slow, and if the initial state is inefficient enough, its beginning may 
moreover be very bad.  The initial losses of little rational entrepreneurs and investors may 
exceed the gains of their more rational competitors, so that the entire market economy may 
start by shrinking rather than growing.  It is only gradually, as the former are losing the 
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possibilities to cause more losses and the latter are increasing their potential to create wealth, 
that this negative trend will be reversed.  Note that this can explain why the growth of 
virtually all new market economies followed the well-known J-curve, and thus also why it 
was wrong to oppose market reforms because of their initially bad results. 
 Concerning financial markets, they are found to be important not only as mechanisms 
allocating investment, but moreover as evolutionary devices selecting investors.  But, to select 
investors for relevant rationality, rather than dishonesty, it is necessary to protect and shape 
these markets by a suitable mixture of formal and informal institutions, including an efficient 
legal framework, fair business practices reposing on reputation effects, and a culture with a 
high level of trust.  Financial markets can then substantially improve the rationality-allocation 
by product markets by shortening the time needed for the discovery and selection of the 
relatively most rational producers, supported by the relatively most rational investors. 
 Assuming that much like any other human abilities, the relevant rationality for 
enterprising and investing is distributed normally, then the most rational producers and 
investors must be expected to form only a small minority of "industrial champions" in the 
upper tail of such a distribution.  The main merit of rationality-allocation by market 
competition is that, sooner or later and under some reasonably realistic conditions, it can find 
this small minority and promote at least some of its members to the positions of the most 
important producers and investors, while incessantly demoting from these positions all those 
whose relevant rationality never was, or no longer is, of such an exceptionally high level.  
Intuitively, competitive markets can thus be compared to tournaments in sports, each of which 
can find the actual top champions in its specific sport, who could hardly be found in any other 
way, including tournaments in unrelated sports.  
 
4  Rationality-allocation by politics-as-selection 
 
While all these advantages and weaknesses of market rationality-allocation are important to 
keep in mind, the main task of Public Choice analysts is to understand how rationality is 
allocated by, and within, governments.  The key feature of this allocation is that its highest 
level, including the selection of last resort, must consist of personal choices, such as voting 
and appointments.  To be sure, personal choices also take place in the market sector – in 
particular between investors and entrepreneurs, and within firms.  But the highest level 
belongs there to market selection, which ultimately sanctions both investors and firms if their 
personal choices lack rationality.  
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 The basis of rationality-allocation by personal choices is the relationship between the 
rationality of the individuals who choose and the rationality of the ones who are chosen. 
Assumption 2 provides the first clue: the more bounded the rationality of the former, the 
larger errors they will likely commit in estimating the rationality of the latter, so that this will 
also be, in average, more bounded.  This assumption appears possible and plausible to sharpen 
as follows: 
 
 RECOGNIZING-RATIONALITY-BY-RATIONALITY (RRR) ASSUMPTION.  
When estimating the rationality of others, individuals safely recognize, and can therefore 
avoid choosing, all those whose rationality is lower than theirs, but are unable fully to 
appreciate the possibly subtle differences between their rationality and all the higher rationality, 
and may moreover have irrelevant prejudices that make them underestimate the rationality of a 
more or less large subset of such equally or more rational individuals.  They may count in this 
subset themselves, if their prejudices include an inferiority complex.8 
 
 This assumption has the following implication: 
 
 THE RATIONALITY-BOOSTING-BY-VOTING (RBV) PRINCIPLE.  Consider a set 
of voters and a set of candidates from which the voters are electing a subset.  If the rationality 
distribution is the same over both sets, if each voter has an equal number of votes, and if it is 
rational for the voters to vote for the most rational candidates, then the average rationality of 
the elected candidates will somewhat exceed the average rationality of the voters.9 
 
 The proof is trivial.  In the worst case, the least rational voters vote irrelevantly 
(randomly), and will thus in average vote for candidates of the average rationality.  But the 
more rational the voters, the more their voting will be biased  in favour of above-the-average-
rational candidates.  When all the votes are counted, the average rationality of the elected 
                                                 
8 While Assumption 2 is hardly controversial, details of RRR-Assumption may be.  But virtually all of the 
colleagues and students who judged this assumption found it plausible.  Moreover, even if some of its details had 
to be softened, the results of the following analysis would be little affected.  
 
9  A frequent objection against the RBV-Principle has been that people often vote not for the most rational 
candidates, but for candidates with all kinds of other, less relevant properties.  But, provided that in the given 
voting, it is rational for the voters to vote for the most rational candidates, then using other criteria is only a sign 
of their own low rationality, which leaves the principle intact.  Professor Mueller pointed to me that the principle 
is a kin of the Condorcet Jury theorem (Mueller, 2003), although not very close: while the theorem also assumes 
bounded rationality, as it expects all voters to make mistakes, this is equally bounded rationality, as it assumes 
the probability of doing so to be the same for everyone.  
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candidates will therefore be somewhat higher than the average rationality of the voters. 
 Note that rationality analysis is thus more optimistic about democracy than Hayek 
(1944), who accused it of selecting  the worst.  But this optimism is subject to two 
qualifications.  First, the rationality distribution over the candidates might be inferior to the one 
over the electorate, so that the elected candidates would be, in average, only somewhat more 
rational than the other candidates, but not necessarily the voters.  Second – and this involves 
links to more traditional Public Choice arguments, on which more below – the candidates 
might be just ruthless rent-seekers, so that the most rational ones would indeed be the worst. 
 But even in the most ideal case, where both the voters and the candidates have the best 
imaginable intentions, the rationality boosting by democratic voting is only modest: while far 
from selecting the worst, it also remains far from selecting the best.  Although this case may not 
be considered very realistic, it is analytically important, for it accords the greatest benefit of the 
doubt to governments as to their good intentions.  The rationality bounds from which 
governments are then found to suffer can be used for showing that even the most benevolent of 
them, not to cause more harm then good, must abstain from a wide range of complex policies, 
of which national planning is only one extreme example. 
 A rather obvious way of improving the outcomes of voting is allowing more rational 
voters to cast more votes than less rational ones.  But how can such a favorable redistribution 
of voting power be realized? 
 For government, the only admissible way is to do more of the same – that is, employ 
more levels of voting or personal appointing, where the elected/appointed candidates of one 
level become the voters/appointers of the next level.  For example, the democratically elected 
MPs may elect a committee, which selects a sub-committee, which appoints a group of 
experts.  The merit of this way is that at each level, the average rationality of the 
elected/appointed candidates benefits, in average, from a little extra boost.  But this way 
cannot lead very far.  As each of the boosts is only modest, then even in the ideal case, where 
all the individuals involved have the best imaginable intentions, the average rationality of the 
ultimately elected/appointed candidates, although increasingly lifted above the population 
average, will still remain, for any reasonable number of levels, far from the best. 
 That the levels cannot reasonably be very many follows in part from the rising 
administrative costs and communication problems that each extra level is bound to cause.  But 
the most severe constraint appears in the more realistic cases in which each level raises the 
principal-agent problems of asymmetric information, incentives and rent-seeking, thus 
causing considerable agency losses.  A relatively few levels then may then suffice for making 
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these losses exceed whatever gains the marginally improved rationality of government agents 
might be able to realize. 
 Additional insights can be obtained by comparing government with the market sector.  
As noted, this sector may also involve personal choices, and these may also build multilevel 
hierarchies – which, superficially, may appear similar to the government ones.  But there are 
two fundamental differences.  At the highest level, market selection can discover and 
eliminate wasteful hierarchies both harder and faster than political decisions.  At the lowest 
level – if we view the choices of entrepreneurs by investors as cases of voting – market 
selection automatically tends, be it only probabilistically, to redistribute voting power from 
less rational investors to more rational ones.  Political democracy, in contrast, must allow all 
voters to keep an equal number of votes, regardless of how rationally or irrationally they vote. 
 
5  Policy Implications 
 
Returning to the first head of J.S. Mill's criticism of government, the present analysis thus 
provides it with the long-missing theoretical support, and moreover roughly indicates how 
high (or low) government's "mental qualifications" for economic decision-making are likely 
to be: far from both the worst and the best – and in the politically ideal case slightly above the 
average – of the rationality distribution over the entire population. 
 The search for the policy implications of this finding appears necessary to divide into 
two branches: one for the economy's production side and one for its final consumption side.  
The reason is that the two sides substantially differ in the ways in which they may allow 
rationality-allocation to work, and in their dependence on value judgments. 
 The final consumption side is constrained by the requirement that all individuals, 
regardless of their rationality differences, not to starve to death, keep their positions of final 
consumers.  This excludes (at least in civilized societies) evolutionary selection by which 
little rational individuals would purposefully be eliminated.  The working of rationality-
allocation is consequently limited to individual learning of given consumers under the 
constraints of their unequal learning talents. 
 On the production side, in contrast, rationality-allocation can work much more freely: 
a great variety of differently difficult positions can be there designed and redesigned or 
abolished, including the births and deaths of entire firms, and the differently rational 
individuals can be promoted to, or demoted from, all of them, without having to die.  
Provided that market competition is maintained in a reasonably good shape by a suitable 
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combination of formal and informal institutions, rationality-allocation can be expected, as 
indicated in Section 3 above, to converge to matching the most difficult and for the economy 
most important positions with some of the relatively very few most relevantly rational 
individuals – the "industrial champions."   
 Concerning value judgments, the crucial difference is that virtually all of them can be 
concentrated on the final consumption side, so that the policy implications for the production 
side can be made largely value-free.  All that needs to be done is to make the formulation of 
the final demand complete, putting there all that the final consumers might individually and 
collectively demand from production – including demands for job creation, working 
conditions, and nature protection.  The production sector can then be seen to have the value-
free task of most efficiently using the scarce resources available, including rationality, for 
meeting such a complete final demand, whatever this might be. 
 The policy implications for the production side are then quite clear-cut.  From the 
finding that the relevant rationality of government-selected agents is substantially inferior to 
the one of the market-selected industrial champions, it is possible to deduce several 
limitations of the scope of potentially beneficial government policies, which are increasingly 
respected in practice, but still poorly supported in theory – such as excluding selective 
industrial policies and government ownership of firms. 
 That these limitations are more severe than those implied by standard analysis, which 
assumes equally perfect rationality of everyone, including governments, is hardly surprising.  
More interestingly, these limitations are also more severe than the one implied by Hayek's 
(1945) knowledge argument.  While this excludes from government agenda only the most 
difficult tasks than no single human mind can master – with the main example of national 
planning – the present limitations moreover exclude many less difficult tasks that some human 
minds are able to master, but these minds are so scarce that a lasting market selection is 
needed to find them and, equally importantly, keep them in such difficult and important tasks 
only as long as they continue to possess this scarce ability. 
 The example of ownership of firms is particularly instructive.  As so many managers 
appointed by private owners can acquire and effectively use all the needed knowledge for 
making even very large firms innovative and successful, the question has been, what could 
hinder the managers of comparably large government-owned firms from doing the same?  
Already Schumpeter (1942/1976) answered “nothing,” and  neither Hayek, nor any other 
theory has so far proven the opposite – in spite of the extensive empirical evidence that in 
average, government firms perform far less well than comparable private firms. 
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 Concerning the final consumption side, the policy implications of rationality-allocation 
analysis are there much less clear.  The search for them is complicated by two circumstances: 
(1) the rationality of many consumers – in the politically ideal case a majority – is even more 
modest than that of government; (2) much depends on several levels of value judgments – 
including those that concern the contents of final consumption, both of oneself and, depending 
on the subjectively perceived and valued spillover effects, of others; and those that concern 
the form of the political process for settling possible individual differences in different value 
judgments. 
 The basic policy question can then be put as follows:  In which ways, if any, could a 
politically selected government, given its relatively modest rationality, help the very 
differently rational consumers to increase their well-being above the level that they could 
attain by their individual consumer choices and learning? 
 Perhaps the clearest part of the answer concerns public goods.  The demand for them 
can be seen to depend, in agreement with standard views, on the prevailing values of the 
electorate expressed through the prevailing political process, and, in agreement with Public 
Choice theories, on the rent-seeking of government agents, by whom this demand will likely 
be deformed and exaggerated.  Rationality-allocation analysis only adds that this demand will 
not be perfectly rational, neither for the electorate, nor for the government agents themselves.  
For some public goods, however, even an exaggerated, distorted and imperfectly rational 
government financed demand may be preferred, according to the prevailing value judgments, 
to a sum of individual demands.  But rationality-allocation analysis then also brings an 
additional support to the well-known argument that whatever the demand for public goods 
might be, government should only formulate it and finance it, but abstain from organizing and 
managing the production for meeting it.  
 Least clear is in which ways, if any, a moderately rational government could 
paternalistically help the differently rational consumers to improve their private demand, in 
terms of their own preferences.  True, a democratically elected government has been found to 
have the rationality potential for helping many less rational consumers with certain 
challenging choices, and thus increase their own well-being, or the well-being of those of 
their fellow citizens who would feel harmed by spillovers of their little-rational consumption, 
or both.  But three questions remain open, both for analysis and for value judgments: (1) How 
much of this potential would actually be used in the interests of the consumers, and how much 
in the interests of some rent-seeing government agents?  (2) What losses of individual 
freedom and personal integrity would such paternalistic help entail?  (3) What are the terms of 
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the trade-off between these losses and the consumption improvements achieved? 
 These questions cannot be answered here, in part because of the lack of space, but also 
because I am far from knowing their answers myself.  I can thus only offer a few not very 
systematic notes.  Question (1) is clearly a matter for traditional Public Choice analysis.  
Much of its answer depends on the possibilities of the electorate to monitor government 
agents – such as the transparency of democracy and the freedom of media – by which their 
rent-seeking could be, if not eliminated, at least kept within reasonable limits, so that at least 
some of the paternalistic policies could effectively help at least some of the consumers. 
 The answer to question (2) largely depends on the form of the policies.  Perhaps the 
lowest freedom and integrity losses are caused by government help with the inputs for 
individual learning, which institutes the rights of consumers to be informed and the duties of 
firms and/or government agencies to supply them with the corresponding information – e.g., 
about the contents and health effects of food and other consumer goods. 
 In most societies, however, some paternalistic policies may command an 
overwhelming democratic support, in spite of the high losses of freedom and integrity that 
they may cause.  The least controversial example appears to be obligatory primary education, 
which may be seen to help, but at the same time encroach on the freedom and integrity of 
those individuals who are so little rational that they would otherwise not rationally care for the 
education of their children.  More controversial examples are obligatory health insurance and 
retirement plans. 
 The key to all these examples is the trade-off of question (3).  This perhaps most 
importantly depends on the prevailing value of compassion and the spillover effects of 
consumption.  As long as little-rational consumers hurt only themselves, whether or not to help 
them by paternalistic policies strongly depends on the former.  But, if their little-rational 
consumption has strong spillover effects that also hurt others – and what constitutes such effects 
depends on the preferences and values of these others – the democratic support for paternalistic 
policies is likely to grow, and even non-negligible losses of freedom and integrity are likely to 
be tolerated.  A problem is that the value judgments involved may significantly differ between 
cultures and between countries – for instance, important differences of this kind appear to 
exist even between otherwise so close Europe and the USA. 
 All this relates to the recent debate on paternalism under the condition of bounded 
rationality between Thaler and Sunstein (2003) and Glaeser (2005).  Whereas the former 
argued that bounded rationality justifies a mild, "libertarian" form of paternalism, the latter 
objected that even if individuals are only boundedly rational, they still have better knowledge 
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and incentives to take care of their consumption than boundedly rational government agents.  
From the present point of view, both these arguments oversimplify the issue by more or less 
implicitly assuming equally bounded rationality.  The recognition of rationality inequalities, 
found to imply that the rationality of government agents, in spite of being far from the best, is 
nevertheless superior to the rationality of a large number of consumers, adds support to the case 
of paternalism.  But this does not entirely refutes Glaeser's argument.  By admitting that 
question (1) remains open, the present argument also admits that under some conditions – e.g., 
poorly working democracy and high level of rent-seeking (corruption) – the rationality 
superiority of government may even decrease, rather than increase, the chances that paternalistic 
policies might serve the interests of the less-rational consumers.  But another open question then 
is, how much, in the absence of paternalistic policies, could such consumers suffer from the 
rent-seeking by ruthless private producers, who might exploit their low rationality in many 
ways – including false advertising and marketing of little effective, or even harmful products.  
Here, however, the open questions may only be noted, while the search for their answers must 
be left to another occasion. 
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